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Abstract
This paper analyzes the responses of incumbent hub-and-spoke carriers to low cost carrier
(LCC) entry on routes served to and from their hubs over the past decade. Our analysis ¯nds
that the typical price and capacity response by incumbent hub-and-spoke carriers to LCC entry
has been fairly accommodating. Moreover, our analysis also ¯nds{somewhat surprisingly{that
the likelihood of an LCC's entry into a hub market being successful is unrelated to the relative
response of the incumbent.
JEL Classi¯cations: L11, L93
Keywords: Airlines, Entry, Exit, Accommodation, Predation
¤The authors thank Dan Kasper, Nick Rupp and participants of the 2003 Southern Economics Association
Meetings for helpful comments. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily
re°ect those of LECG, LLC.
yDepartment of Economics, Box B, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island, 02912. E-mail:
Harumi Ito@Brown.edu, Tel: (650)-329-9743, Fax: (401)-863-1970.
zLECG, LLC. 350 Massachusetts Avenue, Suite 300, Cambridge, MA 02139. E-mail: darin lee@lecg.com. Tel:
(617)-761-0108, Fax: (617)-621-8018.\Claims of predation are more credible when they involve not only price cuts, but also
signi¯cant capacity increases or other changes in network operations by Incumbent."1
1 Introduction 1
The competitive confrontation between low cost carrier (LCCs) entrants and incumbent hub- 2
and-spoke carriers has become a topic of widespread interest in the deregulated passenger airline 3
industry, both in the U.S. and abroad (i.e. Morrison 2001, Dresner, Lin, and Windle 1996).2
4
Allegations of predatory conduct by incumbent carriers have caught the eyes of both U.S. policy 5
makers and courts, the most notable incident being the recent case brought forth by the U.S. 6
Department of Justice (DOJ) against American Airlines.3 Moreover, in 1998, the U.S. Department 7
of Transportation (DOT) issued tentative guidelines for evaluating whether incumbent hub-and- 8
spoke carriers were engaged in \unfair exclusionary conducts."4 In particular, the DOT statement 9
asserted that \In recent years, when small, new-entrant carriers have instituted new low-fare service 10
in major carriers' local hub markets, the major carriers have increasingly responded with strategies 11
of price reductions and capacity increases not to maximize their own pro¯ts but rather to deprive 12
the new entrants of vital tra±c and revenues." This paper focuses on two main questions. Firstly, 13
how aggressively have incumbent carriers responded to low-cost carrier entry over the past decade? 14
Secondly, is there any relationship between the aggressiveness of an incumbent carrier's response 15
to new LCC entry and the probability that the LCC will subsequently exit the market? 16
From an economic policy perspective, there appear to be two primary aspects of an incumbent's 17
response to LCC entry that receive the majority of attention. The ¯rst area of concern revolves{not 18
surprisingly{around the incumbent carrier's pricing behavior following entry. It has been common 19
practice for incumbent carriers to match the fares o®ered by the new entrant LCC on a portion of 20
its seats (Transportation Research Board 1999). And while the practice of \meeting competition" 21
has been supported by notable economists (i.e. Baumol 1998) as well as U.S. courts,5 others argue 22
1\Predation In the Airline Industry," Remarks by Roger W. Fones, Chief. Transportation, Energy, and Agricul-
tural Section, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Before the American Bar Association Forum on Air
and Space Law, Seattle, Washington June 12, 1997.
2In Canada, for example, Air Canada was recently charged by the Commissioner of Competition with predation
following complaints by two low cost carriers, CanJet and WestJet. (See Commissioner of Competition v. Air
Canada). Likewise, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) recently charged Qantas with
predation on the Adelaide{Brisbane route, where it faced entry by Virgin Blue. (See Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission v. Qantas Airway Limited, In the Federal Court of Australia, New South Wales District
Registry, No. N408, 2002). In Germany, the Bundeskartellamt recently issued an injunction against incumbent
carrier Deutsche Lufthansa, requiring it to increase its fares on the Frankfurt-Berlin route following a price war
that ensued after start-up carrier Germania entered the market. (See \Bundeskartellamt prohibits Lufthansa from
hindering its rival Germania", BundesKartellamt press release, February 19, 2000).
3See United States v.AMR Corp, American Airlines Inc., and AMR Eagle Holding Corporation, Civil Action
No. 99-1180-JTM, May 13, 1999.
4Department of Transportation, O±ce of the Secretary, Docket No. OST-98-3713, Notice 98-16, April 1998.
5See Memorandum and Order of Judge Thomas Marten, in United States of America vs. American Airlines,
United States District Court for the District of Kansas, No. 99-1180-JTM.
2that the price-matching response, more often than not, results in anti-competitive consequences 1
(Edlin 2002). 2
The second primary concern revolves around the incumbent carriers' capacity decisions follow- 3
ing LCC entry (or the announcement of planned entry). It has been observed that incumbent 4
carriers often add additional °ight frequencies or use larger aircraft on routes entered by low 5
cost carriers (Transportation Research Board 1999), a practice that has been highly controversial. 6
While Ordover and Willig (1998) argue that capacity additions by incumbents are economically 7
rational and can be pro-competitive, Edlin and Farrell (2002) note that in the recent U.S. DOJ 8
vs. American Airlines case, \The government claimed not that American's prices were predatory, 9
but that its expansion of °ight schedules{described as `capacity increase'{was." Likewise, some 10
industry observers in Canada (Lazar 2000) have suggested that \...Air Canada should not be al- 11
lowed to... Increase frequencies and/or use larger capacity aircraft on routes where an entrant has 12
announced an intention to start operating or has started °ying." 13
In this paper, we analyze the price and capacity responses of incumbent hub-and-spoke carriers 14
to LCC entry over the past decade in the U.S. domestic airline industry. We begin by documenting 15
some stylized facts regarding the nature of LCC entry into hub markets, as well as the competitive 16
response they have evoked from incumbent carriers. Using a relatively large sample of LCC entry 17
events, we investigate how prevalent \aggressive" responses by incumbent carriers have been. 18
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we assess the degree to which the \aggressiveness" of an 19
incumbent carrier's response impacts the probability of exit for a new entrant LCC using an probit 20
exit model. 21
\Predatory behavior" is a controversial topic, both in industrial organization theory its the 22
antitrust application. A predatory incumbent responds to an entrant by lowering its prices below 23
its costs, thus forcing the entrant to endure ¯nancial losses and eventually exit the market. The 24
source of theoretical contention often centers around the predator's rationale. The incumbent 25
su®ers ¯nancially from predating, but, a well-established incumbent may be able to sustain itself 26
longer in a war of attrition if it has the a deeper purse than an entrant who may have more limited 27
¯nancial resources. Thus, the ¯nancial loss of successful predation is compensated by higher 28
pro¯ts after the entrant exits. The promise of recoupment, however, depends on the assumption 29
that no other entrants will threatens pro¯tability immediately after the entrant's exit. Skeptics 30
of predatory pricing date back to McGee (1958), who questioned the rationality of predatory 31
conduct in comparison to other strategies such as mergers or acquisition. Milgrom and Roberts 32
(1982) and Salonar (1987) employ models of asymmetric information where predatory action can 33
be derived as the rational behavior of incumbents. In practice, although price wars following 34
entry are commonly observed in many industries, questions often remain as to whether they re°ect 35
3the predatory conduct by incumbents. The Areeda and Turner (1975) Test employs a cost-based 1
de¯nition while Ordover and Willig (1981) propose more a general standard that takes into account 2
preconditions of market structure and pro¯tability. 3
We emphasize that our goal is not to determine whether or not incumbent carrier responses 4
have or have not violated U.S. predatory pricing laws. Indeed, an analysis of this sort would require 5
detailed, route-level cost data that is not publicly available. Rather, our goal is to document and 6
empirically assess at more general level the patterns of incumbent capacity and price responses 7
to LCC entry to determine whether or not there have been{as many have alleged{a pattern of 8
aggressive incumbent responses to new entry over the past decade that may have hindered com- 9
petition in the industry. We believe that such exercises are useful in assessing the applicability 10
and usefulness of general rules or de¯nitions for evaluating the \unfair exclusionary conduct" of 11
incumbent carriers in the industry. 12
The paper most related to ours in the literature is that of Bamberger and Carlton (1999), which 13
(among other things) compares the success rate of new entrant LCCs to those of major carriers 14
in newly entered city-pair markets.6 As part of their analysis, Bamberger and Carlton (1999) 15
also examine the responses of incumbent carriers to LCC entry into hub routes and ¯nd that the 16
median response to LCC entry of the incumbents has been surprisingly modest.7 While many of 17
our results are consistent with those of Bamberger and Carlton (1999), our analysis di®ers from 18
theirs in several important respects. First, while the sample of markets used to assess incumbent 19
responses by Bamberger and Carlton (1999) was relatively small (39 suspected markets), our 20
sample contains 370 entry events.8 Second, whereas the response statistics reported by Bamberger 21
and Carlton (1999) are independent of the LCC's level of entry, our results measure the level of 22
response relative to both the incumbent's pre-entry service level as well as the LCC's magnitude 23
of entry. This is an important distinction since a capacity response of 20% following LCC entry 24
would have di®erent competitive implications depending on whether the entrant had entered with{ 25
for example{5% of the incumbent's original capacity versus 50%. Finally, our analysis goes one 26
step further by estimating a probit exit model to determine whether or not incumbent responses 27
can be linked to an LCC's decision to exit a market. 28
In addition to Bamberger and Carlton (1999), there have also been a number of recent papers 29
explicitly addressing issues related to predation in the airline industry. Eckert and West (2002), for 30
example, compare the Canadian competition policy approach to predation with that of the U.S., 31
6Other studies of incumbent responses to LCC include Dresner and Windle (1999) and Whinston and Collins
(1992).
7For example, the authors ¯nd that incumbent carriers lowered their average fare by median value of 4.7%
relative to their pre-entry levels on hub-markets entered by LCCs. Likewise, the authors found that the incumbents
reduced the median number of seats o®ered by 1.2%.
8Bamberger and Carlton (1999) restrict their analysis to markets less than 750 miles that were entered by LCCs
other than Southwest between May 1996 and the end of 1997.
4while Edlin and Farrell (2002) provide a critical assessment of the recent Federal Court decision in 1
the U.S. DOJ vs. American Airlines. A somewhat di®erent{albeit related{segment of the literature 2
analyzes the occurrence of price wars in the airline industry (Morrison and Winston 1995, Ross 3
1997, Busse 2002, Fournier and Zuehlke 2003). In general, these papers have focussed on de¯ning 4
precisely when price wars occur and better understanding the factors (i.e., multi-market contact, 5
¯rm ¯nancial condition, etc.) leading to price wars. 6
In general, we ¯nd that the typical capacity response by incumbent carriers to LCC entry at 7
their hubs{measured in terms of the percentage increase in available seats and/or °ights{has been 8
surprisingly modest. Indeed, in our sample of 370 hub markets entered by LCCs between 1991 9
and 2002, the incumbent introduced roughly 30% fewer seats and °ights than the LCC entrant in 10
the four quarters following the quarter of initial entry. Likewise, while the incumbent's average 11
fare typically drops substantially following LCC entry, it falls on average by twenty-six percentage 12
points less than the new entrant's average fare (relative to the incumbent's pre-entry average fare). 13
We also ¯nd that incumbent capacity responses to LCC entry have varied widely across carriers. 14
While Northwest and Alaska appear to be the most aggressive (in terms of capacity responses) to 15
LCC entry, American and Continental appear to have the most restrained responses. In fact, both 16
American and Continental reduced{on average{the number of seats o®ered in hub markets entered 17
by LCCs. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we ¯nd little evidence that the response of the 18
incumbent carrier has any impact on the likelihood that an LCC's entry proves to be successful. 19
In particular, when an LCC's \success" in a market is de¯ned by whether or not it eventually 20
exits that market, we ¯nd that the incumbent's relative capacity response is not an important 21
explanatory factor. In terms of the incumbent's price response, our analysis ¯nd that sharp price 22
cuts by the incumbent following LCC entry in fact decrease the probability of the LCC exiting the 23
market. 24
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the data used in our anal- 25
ysis and documents some stylized facts about LCC entry and the responses they have evoked from 26
incumbents over the past decade. In Section 3, we estimate LCC probit exit models. Concluding 27
remarks are provided in Section 4. 28
2 Incumbent Responses to Low Cost Carrier Entry in the 29
U.S. Airline Industry 30
Our analysis begins by documenting some stylized facts about the nature of LCC entry and the 31
responses they have evoked from incumbent hub-and-spoke carriers over the past decade in the 32
U.S. domestic airline industry. 33
52.1 The Data 1
Data on °ight frequency and capacity for our analysis is taken from the U.S. DOT's domestic T100 2
database, which records monthly data on all °ights completed by the large certi¯ed commercial 3
carriers. Fare and passenger data for our analysis is taken from the DOT's OD1B database, a 10% 4
sample of all domestic tickets. 5
Almost all predatory allegations involve the \hub" markets of incumbent carriers. Thus, we 6
focus our attention on markets to and from major hub airports. More formally, our base data 7
set is comprised of all non-directional airport-pair markets greater than 100 miles that (a) include 8
the \hub" of at least one major hub-and-spoke carrier (Alaska, American, Continental, Delta, 9
Northwest, United or US Airways) as one of its endpoints, and (b) were entered by one or more 10
low cost carriers between 1991 and 2002.9
11
The set of low cost carriers we consider in our analysis are: Southwest, AirTran/ValuJet, 12
Frontier, ATA, JetBlue, Spirit, Sun Country, Vanguard, ProAir, Western Paci¯c, Reno, Markair, 13
Kiwi, Carnival, National and Air South.10 Since the use of regional code-sharing partners has 14
become increasingly important to the major carriers' hub-and-spoke systems over the past decade 15
(especially following the introduction of regional jets), we also include °ights operated by regional 16
carriers that are wholly-owned or have exclusive (or near exclusive) code-sharing relationships with 17
one of the major hub-and-spoke carriers.11
18
Since many low cost carriers have entered certain hub markets via service to alternative airports, 19
we group airports in Dallas, Houston, Chicago and Detroit. In each of these four cities, carriers 20
tend to serve{almost exclusively{only one of the two large commercial airports.12 Since relative 21
°ight frequency is likely to be an important factor in°uencing competition between incumbents 22
and entrants in most markets and since it is usually not practical for travellers to depart from and 23
9The hubs included in our analysis are: Alaska (Seattle), American (Chicago, Dallas, Miami), Continental (Cleve-
land, Houston, Newark), Delta (Atlanta, Cincinnati, Salt Lake City), Northwest (Detroit, Memphis, Minneapolis),
United (Denver, Washington-Dulles, Chicago, San Francisco), US Airways (Charlotte, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh).
We exclude America West from our set of incumbent carriers since their cost structure more closely resembles that
of the LCCs than other major hub-and-spoke carriers.
10Our data for AirTran includes ValuJet's data, as AirTran was acquired by ValuJet in 1998 with ValuJet
adopting AirTran's name. It is also important to note that all of the entry events in our sample have exclusively
used \mainline" (i.e., larger than 100-seat) aircraft such as the Boeing 737, McDonald Douglas DC-9, or Airbus
A319/320. Recently, Atlantic Coast Airlines{a large regional carrier{announced plans to convert its business model
from regional code-sharing service to a \low cost carrier" model (Independence Air) using predominantly 50-seat
regional jet aircraft. Since regional jet aircraft have much higher unit operating costs than the larger, narrow-body
jets traditionally used by LCCs, some of our results may not apply to Independence Air's proposed entry.
11The regional carriers we include are: American Eagle and Executive Airlines (American), Continental Ex-
press/Express Jet (Continental), Comair and Atlantic Southeast (Delta), Horizon (Alaska), Mesaba (Northwest)
and Air Wisconsin (United). While we were able to include many of the largest regional codesharing carriers, we
note that there are a number of regional carriers that were not required to ¯le in the DOT's T100 database during
the period we study, such as Pinnacle Airlines (a Northwest Airlines subsidiary) or Atlantic Coast Airlines, which
provides regional feed service for both Delta and United.
12For example, while both American and United have large hubs at Chicago's O'Hare airport, Southwest and
ATA serve the Chicago area exclusively via Chicago's Midway airport.
6return to di®erent airports within the same metropolitan area, we want to ensure that we do not 1
aggregate service in city-pairs where carriers may serve multiple airport-pairs. Consequently, in 2
the other large metropolitan areas with multiple airports (i.e., Los Angeles, San Francisco, New 3
York City and Washington, D.C.), we elected not to group airports together, as many carriers 4
(both incumbent and low-cost) often serve more than one airport in the same metropolitan area.13
5
In our dataset, an entry event is a unique combination of market, incumbent and entrant. If 6
there are two incumbents and one entrant in one market, for example, we count two separate entry 7
events in this market so that we can observe the responses of both incumbents. Since our data set 8
encompasses thirteen years of data, it is possible for a given LCC to enter the same market more 9
than once and such re-entry is counted as a separate entry event.14
10
From our base data set, we excluded markets where there was less than four quarters of pre- 11
entry data for the incumbent carrier. Likewise, we excluded those markets in which there was 12
less than four quarters of data following the LCC's entry. We also required that a carrier serve a 13
market with at least twenty round-trips per month in order to be included. We de¯ne an entry 14
event as four or more consecutive quarters of service by an LCC following at least four quarters 15
where the LCC did not provide service in that market. While we recognize the possibility that 16
there may be a number of legitimate entries where the LCC withdrew prior to serving an entire 17
year, we wanted to minimize the impact of purely seasonal service.15
18
In total, our data set includes 370 unique entry events. Table 1 summarizes the number of entry 19
events, according to incumbent carrier and LCC. Entry events in this table often cluster between 20
speci¯c LCCs and incumbent carriers (i.e, AirTran/Delta and Frontier/United) when these LCCs 21
have established hubs of their own at pre-existing major carrier hub airports. 22
13The one exception we made was with regards to JetBlue's JFK based operations. In order to study the impact
of JetBlue's entry on Continental's Newark based hub markets, we recoded each of JetBlue's JFK based °ights as
Newark based °ights. We recognize that for antitrust purposes, the appropriate market de¯nition is usually assumed
to be city-pairs rather than airport pairs. However, for the purpose of our research questions, we felt that it was
more important to use a smaller set of entry events by controlling for capacity choices in the manner described
above. We acknowledge, however, that our approach does not fully account for all entry in some city-pairs markets
involving hub cities such as Washington-Dulles, where there has been substantial entry by LCCs at neighboring
Baltimore-Washington Airport (BWI).
14To account for the large-scale exit of markets by AirTran/ValuJet following the crash of Flight 592 in May 1996
and the temporary grounding of its °eet, we exclude AirTran/ValuJet observations for the third and fourth quarters
of 1996 as well as the ¯rst quarter of 1997.
15To test the sensitivity of our results, we have performed all our analysis with another data set in which we
require only two quarters of service for valid LCC entries. Neither the signs nor the magnitude of the estimated
probit coe±cients did changed signi¯cantly.
7Table 1: Cross Tabulation of Market Entry Events by Incumbent and LCC 1
Incumbent Carriers
American Alaska Continental Delta Northwest United US Airways Total
AirSouth
¤ 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 5
AirTran 7 0 3 42 4 6 7 69
ATA 19 0 1 0 1 20 2 43
Carnival
¤ 5 0 2 0 0 1 0 8
Frontier 2 0 1 2 1 29 0 35
JetBlue 0 0 13 1 0 1 0 15
Kiwi Int.
¤ 2 0 5 4 0 4 0 15
MarkAir* 6 5 1 3 2 14 0 31
National 2 0 1 0 0 2 1 6
ProAir
¤ 0 0 1 2 5 0 1 9
Reno
y 0 3 0 1 0 3 0 7
Southwest 17 6 9 14 0 21 0 67
Spirit 3 0 3 0 8 4 2 20
Sun Country
¤ 3 0 0 0 13 1 0 17
Vanguard
¤ 6 0 0 4 1 8 2 21
Western Paci¯c
¤ 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2
Total 73 14 40 78 35 115 15 370
¤Filed for bankruptcy protection during during sample period.
yAcquired by AMR Corp., the holding company of American Airline, on December 23, 1998. 2
3
Table 2 summarizes the distribution of the entry events in our data set by year. 4
Table 2: Entry Events by Year 5
Entry Year
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total
JetBlue 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 5 1 15
MarkAir 1 5 15 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 31
Frontier 0 0 0 2 11 3 3 4 2 1 4 5 35
AirTran 0 0 8 13 14 0 2 6 4 12 7 3 69
Kiwi Int. 0 6 4 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15
Carnival 1 2 1 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 8
National 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 1 0 0 6
Vanguard 0 0 0 3 8 0 3 1 5 1 0 0 21
Spirit 0 0 0 2 3 0 0 2 3 5 2 3 20
ProAir 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 2 0 0 0 9
Reno Air 0 0 1 0 1 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 7
Sun Country 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 5 0 0 17
ATA 0 0 1 6 0 0 9 6 3 9 6 3 43
Western Paci¯c 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Southwest 0 7 4 15 6 3 2 2 17 2 2 7 67
AirSouth 0 0 0 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Total 2 20 34 61 46 9 25 27 53 45 26 22 370 6
7
Eight carriers in our data set{Sun Country, Vanguard, ProAir, Western Paci¯c, Markair, Kiwi, 8
Carnival, and Air South{declared bankruptcy during our sample period, while another{Reno{was 9
acquired by American Airlines.16
10
16Sun Country has since re-emerged from bankruptcy and is once again operating °ights to and from Minneapolis.
82.2 Some Stylized Facts on LCC Entry and Incumbent Responses 1
Our ¯rst goal is to document some stylized facts regarding the entry behavior of the di®erent LCCs 2
in our sample. We begin by comparing the entrant's magnitude of entry relative to the incumbent's 3
pre-entry service level (i.e., capacity and prices). Similarly, we compare the post-entry response of 4
incumbents relative their own pre-entry service o®erings. 5
We consider two common measures of a carrier's capacity: °ight frequency and the number 6
of available seats. In addition, we report both the average fare and the number of origin and 7
destination (O&D) passengers as price and tra±c measures. 8
2.2.1 Entrant's Price and Capacity Choices 9
For each entry event, we begin by computing the incumbent's pre-existing service level using data 10
from the four quarters preceding the actual quarter of entry. We exclude data from the quarter of 11
actual entry from this calculation since the incumbent may have already altered its service levels 12
and fares in anticipation of entry. Next, we compute the entrant's entry statistics using data from 13
the four quarters directly following the quarter of entry. Again, we exclude data from the entry 14
quarter because entry may have taken place during the middle of a quarter. For example, for 15
an entry event that took place during the ¯rst quarter of 1996, we measures the entrant's °ight 16





















We measure the entrant's fare choice as the percentage price cut from the incumbent's pre-entry 19
average fare: 20
Ei(Fare) = 1 ¡
P1997qtr1
1996qtr2 Entrant's Average Fare
P1995qtr4
1995qtr1 Incumbent's Average Fare
(4)
For ease of interpretation in later sections, each of the four measures are de¯ned so that large 21
positive numbers indicate larger and more aggressive entry. Moreover, we average the data over 22
four quarters to avoid seasonality. 23
92.2.2 Incumbent Responses 1
As with our entry statistics, we measure the incumbent's responses as the percentage change from 2
its pre-entry capacity and fare levels. As before, our convention is measure the change in the four 3
quarters following entry relative to the four quarters prior to entry (excluding, once again, the 4
quarter of actual entry from both the numerator and denominator). Thus, the incumbent's °ight 5
capacity response to an entry event that occurred during the ¯rst quarter of 1996 is de¯ned as: 6






Likewise, the incumbent's seat response and O&D passenger tra±c are de¯ned like: 7












Finally, the incumbent's fare response is also de¯ned as the percentage decline from its original 8
average fare levels. 9






102.2.3 Median Entry Style and Incumbent Responses 1
Table 3 summarizes, by LCC, the median values of Ei(Flights), Ei(Seats), Ei(Fare) and Ei(Pax) 2
across all of their respective entry events during our sample period. 3
Table 3: Median Entry Statistics for Low Cost Carriers 4
Ei(Flights) Ei(Seats) Ei(Fares) Ei(Pax)
AirSouth 30.4% 31.7% 61.5% 78.2%
AirTran 41.1% 34.1% 59.3% 60.4%
ATA 28.9% 27.3% 49.5% 49.4%
Carnival 23.4% 18.7% 15.0% 40.6%
Frontier 33.0% 30.0% 39.8% 42.3%
JetBlue 46.4% 53.7% 53.9% 68.7%
Kiwi Int. 34.2% 30.7% 42.4% 48.3%
MarkAir 18.2% 16.7% 47.7% 28.0%
National 51.4% 56.5% 29.9% 88.8%
ProAir 25.5% 29.1% 62.4% 24.5%
Reno Air 48.1% 48.1% 43.3% 60.2%
Southwest 48.9% 46.7% 48.0% 111.1%
Spirit 25.8% 25.1% 41.5% 44.3%
Sun Country 16.1% 24.1% 49.5% 38.6%
Vanguard 43.2% 43.5% 66.5% 101.8%
Western Paci¯c 62.7% 67.4% 49.6% 255.0%
Total 34.7% 32.7% 49.5% 59.8% 5
Table 3 demonstrates the large competitive impact that LCC entry typically has on markets. The 6
median fare reduction, relative to the incumbent's pre-entry average price, was slightly less than 7
50%, stimulating 60% growth in O&D passengers at the median relative to the incumbent's number 8
of pre-entry passengers. The fact that LCCs can stimulate such growth in O&D passengers by 9
adding slightly more than one-third of the incumbent carrier's pre-entry capacity level (in terms of 10
trips or seats) re°ects the fact that a substantial portion of the incumbent's capacity is intended to 11
feed connecting tra±c into its hub. For the LCC, a much larger portion (and in many cases all) of 12
its passengers are O&D passengers, since many LCCs primarily operate point-to-point, rather than 13
hub-and-spoke networks.17 Table 3 also indicates that LCCs di®er signi¯cantly in their \style" of 14
entry. While Southwest and JetBlue's median seat capacity in the ¯rst year following entry has 15
been roughly 50% of the incumbents' pre-entry capacity, Spirit, ProAir and ATA's median seat 16
capacity has been half of that. In terms of prices, Vanguard, ProAir, Air South and AirTran tend 17
to reduces prices the most{relative to the incumbent's pre-entry average fares, while Frontier, Kiwi 18
and National have tended to be the least aggressive in terms of pricing. This di®erence in entry 19
styles is a key to understanding the nature of competition between incumbents and LCCs. 20
Table 4 summarizes the median values of Ii(Flights), Ii(Seats), Ii(Fare) and Ii(Pax) across 21
each of the markets where the respective incumbent carrier faced entry. 22
17The primary exceptions, in our data, are AirTran and Frontier, both of which primarily operate hub-and-spoke
networks.
11Table 4: Median Response Statistics for Incumbents 1
Ii(Flights) Ii(Seats) Ii(Fares) Ii(Pax)
American 1.3% -0.6% 8.6% 5.4%
Alaska 11.8% 13.0% 11.6% 41.7%
Continental -4.4% -0.3% 14.8% 8.1%
Delta 2.3% 5.2% 25.3% 17.2%
Northwest 11.8% 10.1% 15.0% 36.8%
United 3.9% 3.0% 16.8% 17.3%
US Airways 4.9% 6.5% 20.5% 27.3%
Total 2.9% 4.0% 15.1% 16.2% 2
Table 4 indicates that{on average{incumbent carriers have responded somewhat passively to LCC 3
entry at their hubs, which is consistent with the ¯ndings of Bamberger and Carlton (1999). While 4
the median LCC entrant introduces 32.7% additional seats (relative to the incumbent's pre-entry 5
capacity) into a hub market, the median capacity response by incumbents has only been 4.0%. 6
In terms of averages fares, the median incumbent response has been to reduce its average fares 7
by 15.1% (compared to 49.5% by the entrant).18 As was the case with Table 3, Table 4 demon- 8
strates that there are signi¯cant di®erences in the median response across the incumbent carriers. 9
While American and Continental have actually reduced the absolute number of available seats (on 10
average) in the hub markets where they have faced LCC entry, Northwest and Alaska have each 11
increased seat capacity by more than 10%. In terms of average fare reductions, Delta's median 12
fare reduction relative to its pre-entry levels has been the largest (25.3%), while American's has 13
been the smallest (8.6%). 14
2.2.4 Relative Responses Statistics 15
The median response statistics in Table 4 beg an obvious question: to what extent are a particular 16
incumbent's responses in a given market a result of the magnitude of entry it faces? For example, 17
is American's median capacity response the lowest simply because it faces the least aggressive 18
entrants? In order to shed some insight into these questions, we now turn our attention to the 19
incumbents' responses relative to the entry they have faced. De¯ne an incumbent's relative °ight 20
response to entry event i as: 21
Ri(Flights) = Ii(Flights) ¡ Ei(Flights)
Ri(Seats) and Ri(Pax), Ri(Fare) are de¯ned analogously. Since each of our relative response 22
statistics are calculated as the di®erence between the incumbent's response and the entrant, the 23
smaller its value (in absolute value), the less aggressive the incumbent's fare response. Table 5 24
18It is important to note that one should not{in general{expect that the incumbent's average fares will drop as
much as the entrant's, since the incumbent carriers typically o®er both coach as well as ¯rst class service.
12summarizes the median relative response measures for each of the incumbent carriers. 1
Table 5: Median Relative Response Statistics for Incumbents 2
Ri(Flights) Ri(Seats) Ri(Fares) Ri(Pax)
American -33.7% -35.9% -28.7% -72.9%
Alaska -22.9% -30.1% -17.9% -0.3%
Continental -37.9% -34.1% -19.2% -47.1%
Delta -36.1% -28.1% -32.6% -48.8%
Northwest -12.1% -13.2% -25.6% -0.6%
United -32.8% -32.3% -25.9% -44.9%
US Airways -35.6% -35.0% -21.8% -29.0%
Total -32.7% -29.6% -25.8% -43.4% 3
The ¯rst thing to notice from Table 5 is that most median relative responses statistics are strongly 4
negative. In all categories, the entrants' scale and price cuts outpace the responses of the incum- 5
bents, which con¯rms the passive nature of the incumbents' responses seen in Tables 3 and 4. For 6
example, American, US Airways and Continental on average tend to add the fewest additional 7
seats relative to the entrant. Indeed, Table 5 shows that American{on average{has added 35.9% 8
fewer seats than the LCC entrants it has faced. Northwest, on the other hand, has been the most 9
aggressive in terms of capacity responses, adding on average 13.2% fewer seats than the LCC en- 10
trant. The primary di®erence between Table 4 and Table 5 with respect to capacity responses is for 11
Alaska. While Table 4 indicates that Alaska tends to add the most seats of all the incumbents (its 12
median value of Ii(Seats) is 12.9%), Table 5 shows that its median relative seat response (30.1%) 13
is on par with overall median (29.6%). This suggests that in the Seattle hub markets where Alaska 14
has faced LCC entry, the LCC has tended to enter with relatively high levels of capacity. 15
Turning now to the relative fare responses, Table 5 indicates that Alaska has been the most 16
aggressive{reducing its average fares by 17.9 percentage points less than the entrant. In contrast, 17
both Delta and American have been the least aggressive in terms of relative fare responses, reducing 18
fares{on average{by roughly thirty percentage points less than the entrant. The fact that Delta's 19
median relative fare response is the largest (in absolute value) of the incumbent carriers while its 20
absolute fare response from Table 4 was the smallest indicates that the LCCs that have entered 21
Delta's hub markets tend to do so with very large fare reductions. 22
2.2.5 Capacity and Fare Interactions between Incumbents and Entrants 23
Although the relative response statistics in Table 5 are helpful in understanding the median re- 24
sponse of incumbent carriers to new entry, the numbers by themselves do not reveal much about 25
the level of post-entry competition played out between the incumbent and the entrant. For exam- 26
ple, Ri(Fares) = 0 cannot distinguish between a simultaneous price reduction of 40% or 5%. To 27
better see the precise interactions between the incumbents and the entrants, we plot the data and 28
obtain a bird's eye view of its distribution. Among the four competitive metrics we have presented 29
13(°ights, fares, seats and passengers), we focus our attention on two key choice variables, fares and 1
seats, as these have been the focus of attention in the controversy surrounding incumbent responses 2
to LCC entry. While we recognize that °ight frequency is also an important measure of capacity 3
as well as service quality, the °ights and seats variables tend to be highly correlated in our data 4
set. Consequently, for the remainder of our analysis, we chose seats as our primary measure of 5
capacity. 6
Figure 1 plots the incumbent's fare response Ii(Fares) relative to the entrant's Ei(Fares) in 7
each of our 370 entry events. As in the previous section, the unit of observation is a market- 8
incumbent-entrant. The diagonal line in Figure 1 indicates a \perfectly matched" response by the 9
incumbent. 10
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 11
In general, the incumbents' fare responses tend to be smaller than the entrants (i.e., the data 12
lie below the 45 degree line). While this may partly re°ect the generally \modest" price responses 13
by incumbents, it may also re°ect the limitation of using average fares. There are two reasons 14
why the average fare may not re°ect the full picture of price competition. First, incumbent \full 15
service" carriers tend to have more di®erentiated fare structures than LCCs, as they typically o®er 16
two di®erent classes of service (¯rst and coach). Second, when incumbents match the price cuts of 17
LCCs, they typically do so on a limited inventory basis. Nevertheless, Figure 1 clearly shows the 18
tendency for the price response of incumbent to be roughly aligned with that of the LCC entrant. 19
Figure 2 plots the capacity choices for incumbents and entrants in terms of the percentage 20
increase in quarterly seats relative to the incumbent's pre-entry levels. Unlike the price responses 21
in Figure 1, there does not appear to be any obvious correlation between the incumbent's and 22
entrant's capacity choices. It is noteworthy that the majority (70%) of incumbent responses cluster 23
around §15% from their pre-entry capacity level. Approximately 38% of the incumbents have zero 24
or negative capacity responses, electing a fully accommodating or complacent response to entry. 25
Strongly positive incumbent responses appear to be exceptions rather than the norm. Thus, of 26
the 370 observations, only twenty nine (or less than 8%) represent cases in which the incumbents' 27
capacity expansion outpaced that of the LCC. Moreover, almost all of those cases are between 28
relatively small scale entries and similarly small scale responses. Another observation worth noting 29
is the relatively large scale of some market entries. While many entries represent a small fraction 30
of the incumbent's pre-existing capacity, more than one-quarter (28%) of the entries are those in 31
which the entrant chooses a capacity level of 50% or more of incumbent's pre-entry capacity. 32
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 33
14In summary, we ¯nd that the response of incumbent carriers to LCC entry{both in terms of 1
capacity expansion and prices reductions{tend to be much smaller than those of entrants. Although 2
incumbents show a tendency to match the entrants' price cuts (albeit on a limited inventory basis), 3
their capacity responses are often quite modest. The entry events themselves, on the other hand, 4
tend to vary considerably, both by carrier, and often within carriers. While some LCCs such 5
as Frontier appear have adopted a \cream skimming" strategy (entering typically on a relatively 6
small scale and only moderately cutting prices), others carriers such as AirTran have tended to 7
be more aggressive, both in terms of capacity and fare reductions. Naturally, we suspect that 8
the nature of the competitive pressure facing incumbent carriers post-entry can vary signi¯cantly 9
depending on the type of entry they face. Indeed, such variation in the competitive interaction 10
between incumbents and LCCs may present some di±culty in de¯ning \generally" applicable rules 11
for characterizing exclusionary conduct. 12
3 Incumbent Responses and LCC Exit: Is There a Link? 13
Numerous LCCs and some competition authorities, both in the U.S. and abroad, have alleged that 14
exclusionary conduct by incumbent carriers following entry into their hub markets have forced 15
them to exit markets they would otherwise like to serve (Transportation Research Board 1999). 16
As discussed earlier, while there is much anecdotal evidence documenting this type of behavior, 17
there have been few{if any{general conclusions regarding the impact of such alleged actions on 18
an entrant's success. In this section, we attempt to determine the degree to which allegations of 19
exclusionary conduct are supported by the data by estimating a probit exit model. 20
3.1 Exit Events 21
We de¯ne an \exit" as four or more consecutive quarters of absence from a market. Since we 22
are interested in assessing the impact of incumbent responses (rather than other extraordinary 23
exogenous events) on LCC exit probability, we needed to take into consideration a number of 24
\exit" events that were primarily caused by other factors. In particular, we excluded two exit 25
events from our dataset that came as a result of American's acquisition of Reno Air. Likewise, 26
since we excluded AirTran data for three quarters directly following the crash of one its aircraft in 27
May 1996 (which resulted in the subsequent temporary grounding of its °eet), some of the markets 28
where AirTran temporarily suspended service are not counted as formal exits.19 To minimize the 29
potential for \right censoring" in our data set, we dropped entry events from our data set that 30
19The markets that AirTran withdrew from for more than seven quarters were counted as exits.
15occurred after 2000. Finally, we exclude markets that were exited as a result of the cessation of 1
service due to bankruptcy.20
2
LCC exits from markets are not an uncommon phenomena. Indeed, after modifying our entry- 3
event data set as described above, our data set includes 265 entry events, of which 89 were exited. 4
Table 6 summaries the exit events by entrant and incumbent and demonstrates{not surprisingly{ 5
that there are signi¯cant ¯rm di®erences in terms of entry success. For example, of the 14 hub 6
markets that JetBlue has thus far entered, none have been exited.21 Likewise, Southwest only 7
exited three of sixty-seven hub markets it entered in our data set. 8
Table 6: Cross Tabulation of Market Exits by Incumbent and LCC 9
Incumbent Carriers
American Alaska Continental Delta Northwest United US Airways Total
AirSouth 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2
AirTran 2 0 1 12 2 4 1 22
ATA 5 0 0 0 0 4 0 9
Carnival 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 3
Frontier 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3
JetBlue 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kiwi Int. 1 0 2 3 0 3 0 9
MarkAir 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2
National 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Southwest 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 3
Spirit 0 0 3 0 0 0 2 5
Sun Country 3 0 0 0 12 1 0 16
Vanguard 4 0 0 3 1 6 1 15
Western Paci¯c 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 17 1 8 22 15 22 4 89 10
11
3.2 Pro¯le of Exit Events 12
Since exit from a market by an LCC is not an uncommon event, it is useful to pro¯le some basic 13
stylized facts of \successful" versus \unsuccessful" entry attempts. Table 7 compares the entry and 14
response characteristics of the market events in our sample broken down by exited and non-exited 15
events. 16
20Note that this does not imply that we exclude all market exits by carriers that are now bankrupt, since markets
that were exited in the years prior to bankruptcy are still are still included in our sample. To test the sensitivity
of our results, we also performed our probit analysis including the bankruptcy events. Neither the signs nor the
magnitudes of any of our estimated coe±cients changed signi¯cantly.
21We note that JetBlue recently announced that it would exit the Atlanta-Long Beach and Atlanta-Oakland
markets. Since JetBlue entered these markets in late 2002, these entry events were not part of our data set.
16Table 7: Statistical Pro¯le of Market Entry Events 1
(Median Values) 2
Incumbents Entrants
Ri(Seats) Ri(Fares) Ei(Seats) Ei(Fares)
Non-Exits 4.5 10.8 37.3 47.3
Exits 3.5 10.7 27.7 52.2
Total 3.8 10.7 33.3 48.9 3
Market entry events that eventually result in exit are typically smaller scale entries. At the median, 4
the exit events have 27.7% of the incumbent's original capacity while the successful entries have 5
37.3%. The price reductions of failed entries are slightly deeper (median of 52.2%) than the 6
successful entries (median of 47.3%). Somewhat surprisingly, the incumbents' capacity responses 7
tend to be slightly smaller (median of 3.5%) in exit events versus successful entries (median 4.5%). 8
Equally surprisingly is the fact that there is no discernable di®erence in the incumbents' price 9
reductions between successful and failed LCC entries. As alluded to earlier, in light of the highly 10
di®erentiated fare structures of incumbent carriers, we recognize the di±culty of determining the 11
nature of price competition using the average fares alone. Nevertheless, it appears as though the 12
magnitudes of the incumbents' capacity and price cuts may not be signi¯cant factors in determining 13
which market entries eventually fail. We investigate this possibility in the probit exit model in the 14
following section. 15
Table 8 compares some raw pre-entry market characteristics (O&D passengers, seats, and 16
°ights) of successful and unsuccessful market entries.22 Unsuccessful market entries typically 17
occur in signi¯cantly \thinner" markets by all three measures. Most importantly, these markets 18
tend to be comparatively thin in terms of pre-existing O&D passenger tra±c, serving 31% fewer 19
local passengers than those markets where entry was successful. It is possible that LCC operations 20
that typically rely on a large base of O&D (rather than connecting) tra±c were not able to sustain 21
themselves in those markets. 22
Table 8: Some Market Characteristics 23
(Median Quarterly Values) 24
O&D Passengers Seats Flights
Non-Exited Markets 80,869 303,533 2,043
Exited Markets 56,043 229,264 1,880
All Entries 68,135 265,201 1,957 25
3.3 Exit Probit Models 26
In order to determine if LCC exit choices are systematically related to the competitive behavior 27
of incumbents prior to their exit, we estimate a basic probit model using Ii(Seats) and Ii(Fare) 28
as two of our independent variables.23 The dependent variable D(LCC Exit) takes the value 1 29
22The ¯gures in Table 8 are quarterly averages from the four quarters prior to the entry.
23When calculating the incumbent's post-entry pricing/capacity decisions, we compute the average value using
quarters when the LCC is present in the market. Obviously, an LCC's withdrawal from a market is likely to
17if the LCC exited the market and 0 otherwise. If aggressive responses by incumbents are partly 1
responsible for the eventual withdrawal of the LCC, we expect the coe±cients for these variables 2
to be strongly positive and statistically signi¯cant. Since the incumbent's responses should be 3
measured relative to the that of the entrant, we also include the entrants' capacity and pricing 4
choices, Ei(Seats) and Ei(Fare), as control variables. Moreover, we are interested in determining if 5
any particular entry style (i.e., small capacity, aggressive price cutting) contribute to higher failure 6
probabilities than others. We chose not to include the °ight frequency variables (Ei(Trips) and 7
Ii(Trips)) in our estimations since they are highly correlated with Ei(Seats) and Ii(Seats). 8
We perform two separate probit estimations: one with Southwest and one without Southwest. 9
As discussed earlier, Southwest is by far the largest LCC and has an extremely low exit rate. 10
By presenting two samples, we check the sensitivity of our results to the presence or absence of 11
Southwest. 12
3.4 Other Independent Variables 13
In addition to the price and capacity choices of the incumbent and entrant, we include several 14
other market characteristics that we believe may in°uence the success or failure of entrants. When 15
applicable, these variables are de¯ned using the pre-entry market data averaged over the four 16
quarters prior to entry in order to account for possible e®ects of seasonality. 17
It it well understood that LCCs have traditionally focused on serving pre-existing high density 18
markets. Thus, we include ln(O&D Pax), the natural logarithm of quarterly O&D passengers 19
travelling in the market on all carriers as one of our independent variables. If thin O&D passenger 20
density help to explain exit, we expect this variable to have a negative coe±cient. Moreover, 21
the high frequency, quick turn operational models of LCCs provide them with an even greater 22
comparative advantage (vis-µ a-vis their hub-and-spoke carrier counterparts) in short haul markets. 23
Furthermore, it is possible that some passengers may ¯nd the lower level of in-°ight amenities 24
o®ered by LCCs acceptable on short-haul °ights, but less acceptable on longer-haul °ights. Thus, 25
we include ln(distance), the natural logarithm of the market's distance in miles. 26
It is natural to suspect that well-established LCCs with large national footprints may have 27
higher success probabilities than smaller, regional LCCs. In the long-purse story of predation, for 28
example, the more established LCC's may have more staying power in price wars. Alternatively, 29
larger LCCs may simply enjoy high brand recognition, learning-by-doing operational experience, 30
or logistical advantages of larger networks. ln(LCCsize) is the natural log of O&D passengers 31
served by the LCC in all of its markets and is a measure of the LCC's overall size. Since entry, by 32
prompt some degree of fare and capacity adjustments from the incumbent, which we do not want to consider in our
post-entry variables.
18de¯nition, occurs on an airport/city-pair basis in our model, we also include LCC Scope, which is 1
de¯ned as the mean number of destinations served by the LCC from both endpoints of the market 2
entered. 3
We posit that variations in the pre-existing competitive environment may impact the likelihood 4
of success for new entrants. HHI is the pre-entry Her¯ndahl index of the airport-pair market in 5
terms of O&D passengers, while D(Existing LCC) is a dummy variable for markets with pre- 6
existing LCC presence. In addition, to account for the possibility of right-censoring in our data, 7
we include dummy variables for entry events that occurred in 1999 and 2000. Since these are the 8
last two years in our current sample, we have a shorter window of opportunity to observe their 9
eventual exits. 10
Finally, in order to control for systematic incumbent di®erences beyond those captured by our 11
response variables Ii(Seats) and Ii(Fare), we include incumbent carrier dummies (with Alaska 12
Airlines being the base case). 13
Summary statistics for our independent variables are provided in Table 9. 14
Table 9: Summary Statistics of Probit Variables 15
Entire Dataset Without Southwest
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
D(LCC exit) 0.336 (0.473) 0.415 (0.494)
Ii(Seats) 0.060 (0.167) 0.055 (0.157)
Ii(Fares) 0.140 (0.234) 0.133 (0.221)
Ei(Seats) 0.452 (0.400) 0.389 (0.333)
Ei(Fares) 0.459 (0.197) 0.459 (0.191)
ln(Distance) 6.429 (0.614) 6.426 (0.631)
ln(O&D Pax) 11.036 (0.977) 11.067 (0.985)
ln(LCC Size) 9.444 (4.456) 8.225 (4.313)
LCC Scope 4.211 (4.754) 3.227 (3.758)
HHI 0.492 (0.182) 0.516 (0.185)
D(Existing LCC) 0.208 (0.406) 0.222 (0.417)
D(yr 1999) 0.192 (0.395) 0.164 (0.371)
D(yr 2000) 0.166 (0.373) 0.203 (0.403)
American 0.204 (0.404) 0.193 (0.396)
Continental 0.094 (0.293) 0.087 (0.282)
Delta 0.230 (0.422) 0.227 (0.420)
Northwest 0.094 (0.293) 0.121 (0.327)
United 0.298 (0.458) 0.300 (0.459)
US Airways 0.042 (0.200) 0.053 ( 0.225)
Obs. N=265 N=207 16
193.5 Estimation Results 1
Estimation results from our probit model are summarized in Table 10 below. 2
Table 10: LCC Exit Probit Results 3
D(LCC exit)
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(0.145) (0.169)






































% of exits correctly predicted 59.6% 73.3%
No. of observations 265 207
ysigni¯cant at 1%.
¤signi¯cant at 5%. 4
Table 10 indicates that the incumbent's capacity response following LCC entry does not have a 5
statistically signi¯cant impact on the LCC's failure probability{both in the full sample of markets 6
and in those excluding Southwest. The estimated coe±cients on Ii(Fares) on the other hand, 7
is signi¯cant at the 5% level in our sample excluding Southwest, but the coe±cient, somewhat 8
20surprisingly, is negative. This result may suggest that entry is often successful in markets that 1
have pre-existing higher margins where there are large numbers of \un-tapped" passengers who 2
previously had less (or no) access to the low fares o®ered by LCCs. In these markets, the incumbent 3
carrier may realize that once they face LCC entry, their best response is to participate in the market 4
stimulation from lower fares. Thus, the results do not support the hypothesis that aggressive price- 5
cuts or capacity expansions contributed to the LCCs exits. 6
The negative and signi¯cant estimated coe±cient on Ei(Seats) indicates that the larger the 7
initial capacity choice by the entrant, the lower the exit probability. This may re°ects the scale 8
economies necessary for successful entry. Moreover, it is well know that many passengers value 9
high frequency service. 10
The estimated coe±cient on Ei(Fares) is positive, but not signi¯cant at the 5% level. The 11
positive coe±cient tends to indicate, however, that the larger the initial fare reduction by the 12
LCC, the higher the probability of exit. This result may indicate that the LCC{for one reason 13
or another{was unable to attract a su±cient number passengers at pro¯table fares. Alternatively, 14
larger price cuts may simply be indicative of overly aggressive (and possibly ill-conceived) entry 15
by the LCC.24
16
Also noteworthy is the negative and signi¯cant estimated coe±cient on ln(distance). This 17
result, which is contrary to our expectation, indicates that the longer the market's distance, the 18
lower the exit probability. We caution inferring too much from this result however, as LCC entry 19
into longer-haul markets is a rather recent phenomena.25 Moreover, the result may be related to 20
the fact that JetBlue, which has the longest average route length among all of the LCCs, did not 21
experienced any exits in our data set. As expected, larger pre-existing market size measured by 22
ln(O&D Pax) reduces the probability of exit, con¯rming well known result that LCCs are able 23
to leverage their comparative advantage by targeting pre-existing dense markets. 24
As expected, the larger the LCC's absolute size and the larger the number of destinations 25
that the LCC serves at the end-point cities of a market, the smaller the probability of eventual 26
exit. However, while the estimated coe±cient on LCC Scope is signi¯cant at the 5% level, the 27
estimated coe±cient on LCC Size is not. This suggests that brand recognition and pre-existing 28
passenger experience with an LCC is more relevant to the eventual success of a particular market 29
entry than the ¯rm's overall size. Finally, there appears to be some di®erences (although not 30
statistically signi¯cant) in success probability depending on the particular incumbent that is faced 31
by the LCC. While LCCs appear to have had the best success facing United and Delta, they tend 32
24For example, Australian LCC Virgin Blue stated that \The failure of Compass Airlines 1 and 2 has been
attributed to shortcomings in their entry strategy, which misjudged the operational, economic and regulatory
obstacles to large scale entry into the domestic market." Source: Virgin Blue Prospectus, page 42.
25Until recently, for example, AirTran did not possess the aircraft capable of °ying from its hub in Atlanta to the
West Coast.
21to have lower entry success probabilities when facing Northwest and Continental. 1
Overall, our results indicate that aggressive responses by incumbent carriers, measured in 2
terms of percentage capacity increase or percentage price reductions, are not likely to be a general 3
explanation for LCC exit from hub markets. We should emphasize however, that our results do 4
not exclude the possibility that in some markets, the actions of incumbent carriers may have 5
in°uenced an LCC's exit decision. For example, in a relatively small market, the survival of a 6
small new entrant is possibly in°uenced by a relatively small response by an incumbent. In order 7
to explain such outcomes, however, one needs to devise a model that accounts for more subtle 8
strategic interactions between incumbents and entrants. 9
4 Conclusions 10
This paper investigates the responses of hub-and-spoke network carriers to LCC entry on their 11
hub routes. In addition to documenting some stylized facts regarding the pattern of entry and 12
response over the past decade, we examine how these responses have in°uenced LCC market 13
survival probabilities. 14
The responses of incumbent carriers to new entry by LCCs has been a primary focus of both 15
policy-makers and competition authorities, both in the U.S. and abroad. Indeed, numerous parties 16
have alleged that incumbent hub carriers frequently respond to LCC entry with sharp price reduc- 17
tions coupled with aggressive capacity expansion. Concerns over these types of alleged practices 18
were heightened so much during the late 1990's that the U.S. Department of Transportation is- 19
sued tentative guidelines for evaluating whether an incumbent's conduct constituted exclusionary 20
conduct.26 Although anecdotal evidence of such practices is common, questions remains as to how 21
prevalent those aggressive incumbent behaviors have been. This paper attempts to provide some 22
empirical evidence to answer this question using a broad sample of market entry events. 23
We ¯nd that highly aggressive incumbent reactions are more the exception rather than the 24
rule. Moreover, we ¯nd{somewhat surprisingly{that the median response of incumbents to LCC 25
entry at their hubs has tended to be fairly accommodating. Based on our analysis of 370 market 26
entry events, we ¯nd that while the incumbent often aligns their price to that of entrant, it rarely 27
undercuts the entrant's average fares. As for the capacity response of incumbents, we ¯nd no clear 28
evidence that incumbents try to out-pace or even match the entrant's capacity choice. This is 29
contrary to the common perception that the incumbent response of aggressively expanding their 30
capacity following LCC entry is a widespread phenomena. In this sense, our results support the 31
conclusion of Bamberger and Carlton (1999) using an expanded scope of the data. 32
26The Department eventually withdrew its proposal in favor of a case-by-case examination.
22Perhaps the most important ¯nding of our analysis, however, is that we found no evidence that 1
an incumbent's capacity expansion or pricing decisions following LCC entry negatively impacts 2
the probability that the LCC exits a market. Rather, factors such as the entrant's capacity choice, 3
pre-existing market density and the LCC's pre-entry presence at the endpoints of a market appear 4
to be factors which contribute to an entrant's ultimate success or failure. Thus, from a policy 5
perspective, our results suggest that rather than focussing on the nature of post-entry competition 6
between incumbents and entrants, policy-makers should be more concerned with ensuring that 7
LCCs have su±cient access to airport facilities such as gates. Indeed, LCC access to gates at some 8
highly congested hub-airports, is likely to be a topic of heated discussion in the policy arena.27
9
It is important to note that the competitive confrontation between the hub-and-spoke incum- 10
bents and LCC entrants is far from over. Based on the current market capitalizations and aircraft 11
orders of LCCs such as Southwest, JetBlue, AirTran and Frontier, continued growth of LCCs is 12
likely.28 Naturally, the discussion on the incumbents' aggressive responses and their in°uence on 13
possible entry failures is likely to continue and expand in the future. For example, JetBlue's CEO 14
cited intense competition from both Delta and AirTran as reasons for exiting the Atlanta-Long 15
Beach and Atlanta-Oakland markets.29 The primary lesson from our analysis, however, is that a 16
cut-and-dry rule of capacity expansion or price reduction is unlikely to de¯ne{in any meaningful 17
or economically appropriate way{\predatory" or \exclusionary" conduct. 18
27For example, Huston (1999) argue that the number of gates in the hub-airports is the key determinant of
long-run equilibrium in the industry.
28As of November 30, 2003 for example, Southwest's market capitalization exceeded the sum of all other major
carriers combined and JetBlue's market capitalization exceeded that of any of the legacy hub-and-spoke carriers.
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Figure 2: Capacity Responses of Incumbent Carriers
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